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In this latest addition to the Re-reading the Canon series (a series of
collections each devoted to feminist interpretations of a single philosopher),
we are offered thirteen essays on Hume's philosophy, covering his views on
metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, religion, aesthetics politics,
and history. They address all of his main works and many of his less discussed
essays. This diverse collection is bound together by the theme of feminism,
but how this theme works itself in varies considerably from essay to essay.
There are, broadly, four different ways that feminism enters into the interpretations.
First, there are essays which show how current feminist theory can benefit
from some Humean insights; they argue that if we read (or re-read) Hume
in a particular way, we can address concerns or problems that feminist
theorists face. Christine Swanton's 'Compassion as a virtue in Hume' is an
example of this kind offeminist reading. Swanton looks carefully at Hume's
discussion of compassion, sympathy and benevolence, and convincingly argues that his view has much in common with an ethics of care and can help
diffuse the objection that such an ethics is overly demanding, causing
individuals to be lost in the pain of others.
Second, there are essays which show how feminist theory can help Hume;
they argue that he could escape some of his contradictions ifhe were to adopt
some insights from feminist theory. This view is expressed, for example, in
Jennifer A. Herdt's 'Superstition and the Timid Sex', the only essay on
religion. Herdt offers a novel and well-argued interpretation, suggesting that
in Hume's comment that the 'weak and timid sex is responsible for leading
men into superstition', we can find the seeds of a feminist analysis and
critique of the ways in which religion reinforces the socialization of women
into prescribed sex roles (283). Hume's thought is in tension on this matter;
he thought the socialization both necessary and dangerous, but, if we focus
only on what he says about the danger, Herdt shows how a feminist critique
can be gleaned from his writings.
Third, there are those essays that focus on the misogynistic aspects of
Hume's philosophy, pointing out the limits of any feminist-friendly reading
of Hume. These are the least interesting type and do not offer much of
philosophical value. For example in 'The Metaphorics of Hume's Gendered
Scepticism', Aaron A. Smuts argues that, for Hume, imagination and nature
are both feminine. They seduce and deceive the male philosopher so that he
cannot help but maintain beliefs that lack any rational foundation. The
notion that, for Hume, nature is a 'bad woman' does not seem consistent with
all the gratefulness he has for nature saving him from his skeptical moods.
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Last, there are a number of essays which recognize concerns that are
common to both Hume and feminists, and argue that Hume is a philosopher
whose views are of particular importance to feminist thought. Many of the
strongest essays are of this type. For example the first three essays, which
are all concerned with Book One of the Treatise, argue that Hume's view of
knowledge, reason and his conception of philosophy should be of particular
interest to feminist philosophers. In 'Hume: The Reflective Women's
Epistemologist?', Annette Baier points out that Hume recognizes, as do many
feminists, that 'norms -'-- including norms for knowledge acquisition - are
social in their genesis as well as in their intended scope' (30). Hume's
epistemology, she says, is 'fallibilist and cooperative' (31). In 'Hume on the
Passion of Truth', Genevieve Lloyd explores Hume's version of the 'wholeness' of mind, where passions, imagination and intellect are unified instead
of polarized as they are in more traditional masculine philosophy. In 'Reconceptualizing Reasoning and Writing the Philosophical Canon: The Case of
David Hume', Anne Jaap Jacobson argues that, like many feminist philosophers, Hume questions the traditional ideal of philosophy which strives to
conceive of concepts in a purely rational manner.
A number of the conclusions of these three essays are correct. Hume does
think both passions and reason are essential components of humans; reason
does not get exalted as it does among many (though not all) of Hume's
predecessors. But we also find overstatements and overemphases in these
essays. For example, Jacobson is right that Hume questioned the .value of
trying to find final answers to philosophical questions, but when she claims
that Hume 'explicitly rejects the goal of arriving at consistent answers to the
questions addressed' (61), she goes too far. Even though Hume does not claim
his way of solving a problem is the last word on the matter, he did hope that
his theories 'might stand the test of the most critical examination' (Treatise
I.iv.7.14). So he still aimed for consistency and harmony in his philosophical
theories.
Two of the most interesting essays are on Hume's moral philosophy, but
in each feminism seems to enter in as an after-thought; one can imagine
them standing on their own with the feminist parts subtracted. Joyce L.
Jenkins and Rob Shaver's 'Mr. Hobbes Could Have Said No More' is a
well-argued piece focusing on a troubling passage in Hume's second Enquiry
where he says that, if there were a species of creatures intermingled with
men who were greatly inferior in both mind and body, 'we should be bound
by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures', but should
not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to
them.
Jenkins and Shaver suggest that Hume's recommendation of humanity
over justice is justified on broadly utilitarian grounds, that humanity would
better serve the inferior party. The necessarily general and inflexible nature
of justice could stand in the way of what would best serve these people. The
superior could help the inferior more, they argue, if they could make use of
the flexibility of humanity. It is hard to see what is the feminist part of this
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interpretation. It comes in the second section which suggests that with a few
insights from Mill, Hume need not see women as inferior creatures.
Jacqueline Taylor's 'Hume and the Reality ofValue' is a careful discussion
about Hume's metaethics, and rightfully criticizes those who view Hume as
a non-cognitivist, pointing out that Hume's view is much more complex and
more integrative, with moral features and sentiments as reciprocal and
mutually guiding concepts (116). But it is unclear what work feminism is
doing in Taylor's piece. Christopher Williams' 'False Delicacy', which focuses
on Hume's essay 'Of the Standard of Taste', is an insightful discussion of
aesthetic appreciation where again the feminism seems inessential.
What is best in this collection is that it focuses attention on some of the
often neglected aspects of Hume's philosophy. Given that feminists are
concerned with exposing and investigating what is overlooked, this uncovering may be what is most centrally feminist about the book. It also succeeds,
as Jacobson urges in her introduction, in encouraging readers to ask more
questions, to continue the discussion and to find new and creative ways of
reading Hume.
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